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Toward a_ Theory of Educational Finance
Walter W. McMahon*
This book addresses major new issues arising in efficiency and
equity in educational finance that have implications for research and
for educational policy in the next decade. Original contributions by
a number of distinguished economists and educators develop different
aspects of efficiency and equity, their findings and the interaction
that results provide an overview of the state of the art and suggest
insights relevant to new research and to emerging national problems.
The need for a coherent conceptual framework is apparent, and
therefore will be presented in this introductory chapter. The chapter
seeks to go a bit beyond that, and develop a theory of educational
finance that is relevant to policy decisions by considering efficiency
and equity criterion and how they can be combined. The chapters that
follow develop various aspects that relate to this conceptual frame-
work, each with originality and in depth. The final chapter draws
together the main conclusions of each of the preceding authors, and
considers the progress that has been made.
Inefficiency and inequity permeate much of elementary, secondary,
and college education currently. For example, many children are not
learning the basics of reading, writing, and mathematics effeciently,
many college students do not invest sufficient amounts of their own
time in study, and pupil tine and other resources are used ineffi-
ciently in other ways. With respect to equity, the continuing per-
sistence of vast inequality in expenditures per child both within
states and among states stands as mute testimony to the continuing
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inequality of educational opportunity. The returns to education are,
at the same time, vital to our society and important to each indi-
vidual. Finding ways to maintain and to increase these returns and
the equity with which they are distributed in a period of budget
stringency, due to inflation, enrollment declines, and tax pressures
faced by all of education are important to find. These problems sug-
gest the need for further development of a logically consistent theory
of educational finance to aid in isolating inefficiencies and in-
equities in specific educational budget and financing decisions.
Furthermore, it is frequently true that advances in the theory facili-
tate measurement, later, of the relevant concepts, and also suggest
new hypotheses that stimulate new empirical tests and advances in the
subject.
The starting point for a comprehensive theory of educational
finance is most logically the longer run returns to education that are
the ultimate outcome of the educational process. They are of three
kinds: increases in monetary earnings that are a part of measurable
economic growth, private non-monetary returns in the form of non-mone-
tary on-the-job satisfactions and also during leisure time that
improve the quality of human life, and external effects important to
the functioning of democracy and other social institutions. Those
returns taken as a whole are the main justification for the costs of
education, although there are of course some measures of the more
immediate outcomes that can also be related to costs. Human capital
theory helps to bring the non-monetary returns to education as well as
the monetary returns into sharper focus, as will be developed later in
this book. So the concept of efficiency in the educational process
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viewed primarily as a process of investment in human resources to the
end of improving both earnings and the quality of human life will be a
central theme of the theory of educational finance, and of this book.
But this is not sufficient. Equity is also important, especially
where children and the life cycle of families are more deeply involved.
American political and social institutions proclaim equal rights, and
the equality of all citizens, but economic institutions rely on market-
determined incomes that generate substantial inequalities in material
welfare. This obtains head starts for some, so that the quality and
quantity of education available to children and hence children's oppor-
tunities are unequal. For those whose parents incur penalties in the
market place, the result is a degree of deprivation that conflicts
with the younger person' s individual freedom of choice and with demo-
cratic values. Equity considerations therefore must have an important
place also in a broader and more relevant theory of educational finance.
There are trade-offs between efficiency and equity; greater equal-
ity in the resources devoted to each child can sacrifice some effi-
ciency in the total amount of learning as a result of too much time
being devoted to the slower students, for example. But there are also
complementarities. There is some evidence that there is kind of an
"Engel' s law" of educational expenditure, for example, whereby the
more affluent school districts and the more affluent colleges and uni-
versities spend increasing percentages of their budgets on things
other than instructional staff not always to the end of supporting
improvements in quality. To the extent that there are some elements
of waste involved, this is an instance where greater equality in
expenditures per pupil could simultaneously increase efficiency in
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learning. Conversely, greater efficiency can release scarce educa-
tional resources which can then be made available to improve equity in
ways that benefit all who are concerned. Instances which improve both
efficiency and equity can be, in a sense, "Pareto moves" that leave
nobody worse-off, and are deserving of some special attention in this
book.
To draw together these new elements into a central theme, the
theory of educational finance to be suggested here focuses on effi-
ciency and equity in investment in human resources as a means of
fostering humane growth. The efficiency and equity aspects are taken
here to include not just the trade-off's, but also the complemen-
tarities. And humane growth as a goal will be taken to mean not just
the economic growth of measured output, but also the non-monetary
contributions of education to improvements in the quality of human
life and to distributive justice.
I. Human Capital Formation
The concept of investment in human resources and of human capital
formation has given a structure and precision to the economics of edu-
cation that it has not had heretofore. In fact, human capital theory
is having a revolutionary impact on the economics of education as well
as on several other branches of economics, with waves of implications
that are now permeating research on educational finance and educational
budgeting. There are also some practical implications already for
decision makers in the financing of primary, secondary, and higher
education. It is important therefore that we start by considering
briefly the more recent developments in human capital theory in order
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to relate them in a broader theory of educational finance and draw out
their implications for financing and for ongoing research.
Investment in Human Capital Over the Life Cycle
Human capital will be taken here to mean the accumulated stock of
skills and personal attributes created by education, that in turn
yields a flow of monetary earnings during work-time and non-monetary
services largely during leisure time hours over the remainder of the
life cycle. Not that there may not also be consumption satisfactions
enjoyed by the student during the current period while he or she is
still in school, but there is also an investment that yields returns
later. As developed originally by Gary S. Becker (1964, 1975, 1976)
and T. W. Schultz (1961, 1974) the investment involves not only an
investment in market goods in the form of teachers salaries, books,
and the operation of school and college buildings, but also an invest-
ment by the family of the parents' time and of the student's time.
This brings us to the first important concept involving human
capital formation via education that is extended by the research in
this book: the concept of household production of human capital that
includes the use of the parents' time and of the student's time in
the educational process. Charles Benson (in Chapter 3 of this book)
creatively explores new ground by investigating the role of the
parent's time and their socioeconomic status, and how these parents'
time inputs relate to the efficiency and equity of human capital for-
mation. The amount of time students invest is, as every college
teacher knows, very important to the learning process. The amount of
time invested by each student within the classroom is also important.
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J. Alan Thomas (Chapter 4) also explores new ground in this book by
investigating the determinants of the "time on task" in school class-
rooms. This is suggestive of how the efficiency in the use of student
time might be increased. This is important, for as he also points
out, although there may not be costs of student time at the elementary
level that appear either in the school budget or as foregone earnings,
there are opportunity costs to the student and to the society in the
form of learning opportunities missed. T. W. Schultz (Chapter 2) also
suggests that there are quite a few learning opportunities missed.
These are missed, he suggests, by the failure to adequately decentra-
lize educational decision making, especially in the larger city sys-
tems, in ways that it can more effectively involve the parents' time.
Student time wasted, and parental time not utilized effectively,
represents costs in efficiency to the society. This has important
implications for educational policy makers who are charged with the
public trust of securing efficiency in the use of all resources
provided by society and with acting on behalf of society as a whole.
It is human capital formation in this broader sense, that yields
earnings and non-monetary benefits to individuals and society that is
ultimately being financed.
This concept of a household production function for human capital
needs to be made more precise and extended, for it is not only used by
J. A. Thomas and C. Benson, as well as being implicit in the paper by
T. W. Schultz, but it also arises many tim.es in other papers in this
book. Production functions will sometimes be used in the more partial
sense to refer to the production of intermediate outputs by schools
which in a sense become purchased inputs in the broader process of
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producing human capital. But one of the first developments of the
optimal production of human capital that accommodates inputs of stu-
dent time and parents time in a life cycle context is found in early
work by Ben Porath (1967). Because it is basic, it will be useful to
review its significance briefly. It has been made a part of a more
general theory that includes non-monetary returns by Gary Becker (1976)
and James Heckman (1976) in more recent work that will be considered
shortly.
Specifically, the Ben-Porath production function allows for exa-
mining efficiency in the use of student time and parental time by
treating additions to the stock of human capital through education, Q ,
as a function of these as well as of purchased formal schooling in-
puts:
(1) Q^ = eo(s^^K^) ^^
^
In his notation, s^ is the percent of student time, (and hence of the
available stock of the student's human capital, K ) allocated to the
production of additions to the stock of human capital, Q . D are the
purchased inputs of formal schooling, and college buildings. The
parameter 3-. allows for the environmental inputs of parental time, and
the parameters of 6^ and 3™ allow for this student's ability, which
may differ from that of his peers. The process is not necessarily
linear in the logs as shown, but this is a simpler starting place for
purposes of solution, estimation, and exposition that does allow for
analysis of the substitution between student time and other inputs in
the learning process.
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The power of this concept of production of human capital is not
limited to its usefulness in analyzing efficiency in the use of stu-
dent time, parental time, and teacher time toward increasing the value
and usefulness of the student's time. It is even more important in
the unifying concept that it provides for all of educational finance,
since it can apply to pre-school education when the students' existing
stock of human capital, K
, is small, to formal schooling at K-12 or
college levels as K grows, and to on-the-job training and continuing
education in later years. IVhen only monetary earnings are considered,
the solution for the optimal investment in education shows the effi-
ciency of further full time vocationally-oriented education tailing
off in the later years of the life cycle, largely due to the fact that
fewer years remain before retirement during which the increased earn-
ings can be secured, a point that has obvious financing implications.
Extensions of Ben Porath's solution for optimum production of
human capital represent even greater promise for a theory of educa-
tional finance. A major one, for our purposes, has been the develop-
ment by Gary Becker (1976, p. 89) starting back in 1965 of a second
and additional concept of household production that uses the stock of
human capital in the household to produce not only earnings during
work-time hours, but also a flow of utilities or services largely
during consumption-time hours. These utilities, together with Becker's
concept of "full income," provide a conceptual basis for the analysis
of non-market behavior and for the measurement of the non-monetary
returns to education.
This second form of household production yields consumption ser-
vices, X which appear in the household's utility function and yield
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satisfactions over each remaining year of the life-cycle, including
those years after retirement. Specifically:
a a
where s^ is the proportion of time spent not at work but spent
"producing" consumption-time satisfactions x while using the avail-
able stock of human capital K
,
and q are market goods. a^^, a, and
a^ again are parameters reflecting environmental factors and abiity,
and the log-linear functional form is not essential but merely chosen
for convenience. For example, if q is a book purchased on the market,
K is the skill at reading acquired through formal education, and s
the proportion of total time spent reading, x is a flow produced
during the consumption time that directly yields the utilities or
satisfactions from reading a book. The point is developed further in
W. McMahon (1974, p. 28), and the newest research related to it is
creatively reviewed and extended by Robert Michael (in Chapter 5 of
this volume). In principle, the non-monetary returns to education to
be measured are:
6x
^'^
I
Hs^\^) PtVt
The first term is the contribution of one unit of educational capital
used during consumption time hours to private satisfactions, p is the
shadow price or value of these service flows, and d is a discount^
t
factor that discounts non-monetary returns arising later in the life
cycle back to their present value.
The final extension of the concept of optimal investment in human
capital over the life cycle to be considered here is also essential to
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the analysis of the efficiency of the process. It is largely due to
work by James Heckman (1976) and Blinder-Weiss (1976) who have formally
joined the theory of labor supply (which determines monetary earnings)
and the theory of consumption (which includes not only the effects
from spending the earnings yielded by human capital during work-time
but also the non-monetary returns from the use of human capital during
consumption-time) to the theory of investment in education over the
life cycle. For the first time, the optimal accumulation of human
capital at each stage in the life cycle is derived from the point of
view of a utility maximizing household who must also choose the timing
of its labor supply to obtain earnings as well as its inter-temporal
allocation of consumption.
This much lays the groundwork for the analysis of benefits, costs,
and private efficiency conditions as they relate to investment in edu-
cation. Human capital concepts also have a significant contribution
to make to analysis of the sources of inequality in the income distri-
bution, but this will be considered later in connection with equity.
II. Efficiency Criteria
Increased efficiency frees resources that can be used to improve
the quality of education, or to prevent it from deteriorating in a
period of budget stringency, as well as freeing resources that can be
used to improve access. Cost-benefit criteria are the relevant ones
to use to test whether efficiency is being attained or could be
improved in any specific situation.
After considering the distinction between efficiency and equity,
production efficiency and exchange efficiency will be defined. Then
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a cost-effectiveness, cost-benefit hierarchy of efficiency criteria
that centers on the problem of measuring the benefits and that goes
from lower to higher levels will be proposed, analogous to the hier-
archy of equity criteria to be developed in Section III,
The Distinction Between Efficiency and Equity
Efficiency is defined to mean the potential for increases in the
desired outcomes of education without increases in the physical quan-
tities of resource inputs. Efficiency also means (through duality
theorems) the maintenance of the same quantity and quality of educa-
tional outcomes while minimizing the real resources used. To merely
maintain the quality of the education received by students is a common
problem in the face of declines in real resources due to inflation,
fixed costs that are hard to reduce as enrollment declines, and
inflation-induced tax revolts.
Having indicated what efficiency does mean, it is important to
stress what it does not mean, for misunderstandings by administrators,
teachers, and non-academic employees can impede progress that can
benefit students, staff, and taxpayers alike. Efficiency does not
mean "speed up" in the pace and volume of work of teachers and staff
which has had negative connotations since the industrial revolution.
Increases in the number of pupils per teacher, for example, without
commensurate increases in real salaries are technically "non-Pareto
moves" of the type discussed below, since they leave some worse off.
They therefore are not efficiency moves in the strict economic sense
of Pareto-ef f iciency , but must be considered under the heading of
equity-type questions. The word efficiency refers instead to finding
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better ways of doing things, reducing the effort needed to secure the
same outcomes, or improving the outcomes without increased effort.
To distinguish efficiency from equity, the central criterion is
that improvements in efficiency involve changes that make at least one
person better off and no person worse off, whereas equity can involve
redistributions of benefits or of real income that can make some worse
off, to the end of attaining distributive justice. Efficiency moves
therefore are Pareto moves, defined as moves that make at least one
person better off and none worse off. Each such move is a move East,
or North, or Northeast in Figure 1 below, where the utility from
schooling, or lifetime full income, of A and B are measured on the two
axes. l-Tcien all possible moves of this type have been made, line BB,
the grand utility possibility frontier has been reached, and Pareto
efficiency has been attained. Any point below or to the left of BB
such as point Z is inefficient, since any improvement in efficiency
that makes possible a move to point X makes individual A better off.
Similarly a move from Z to fi would make individual B's utility or real
income higher without hurting individual A, and any movement toward
the northeast from Z would improve the welfare of both. This Pareto
criterion is a minimal ethical principle, and the central criterion of
Welfare Theory in economics. The Hicks-Kaldor Compensation Principle,
which allows for compensation to be paid to disadvantaged parties
(e.g., to a teacher whose class size has been increased, or to a home-
owner whose house is destroyed to build classrooms), reduces to the
more central Pareto criterion when compensation is paid since after
the payment of compensation, no one is worse off.
-13-
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Equity goes beyond the attainment of efficiency. Even after all
possible improvements in production efficiency and exchange efficiency
are made so that the grand utility possibility frontier is attained,
there still may be considerable inequality in the distribution of
benefits. At point X for example, where Pareto efficiency has been
attained, individual A who could be a student is benefiting greatly in
the present and future utilities he is receiving, whereas perhaps very
little is spent on student B's education and his benefits as a result
are impoverished. If now there were an omniscient ethical observer
whose perceptions of social welfare are given by the welfare function
WW, the problem of what is equitable can be solved. The contour line
W^ W, represents a higher level of social welfare than does the con-
tour line W, Wp, on which point X is located. So a move from point X
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to point f2 , the point of constrained bliss, redistributes resources
away from Student A and toward Student B, constituting an increase in
equity that is also an increase in social welfare. The paper by Kern
Alexander and T. R. Melcher (Chapter 10) addresses the philosophical
foundations of equity.
Trade-Offs on Complementarity
Trade-offs between efficiency and equity do occur and are the
aspect usually stressed, rather than the possibility of complemen-
tarities. Some educational systems such as those in England and in
some private schools emphasize screening and investment of the most
resources in further development of the brightest minds, more than
do others, because of the losses of efficiency if more resources are
used with the slowest students. In the economy as a whole there are
also trade-offs; differentials in earnings serve as important incen-
tives—rewards and penalties— to promote efficiency in the use of
resources. But the very effectiveness of this incentive device
depends to some extent on a reasonable degree of equality of oppor-
tunity at the starting line. Within education there are also other
reasons for complementarity—notably, children are wards of their
parents, and differences in expenditure per child (unrelated to
ability) that merely make students suffer for the lack of wealth of
their parents in a somewhat capricious fashion is not a positive
incentive that can be defended on the grounds that it promotes effi-
ciency.
We suggest in this book that there are in fact a number of pos-
sible complementarities, where both efficiency and equity are a
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simultaneous result. In Figure 1, for example, a move from Z to ^
increases efficiency by moving toward the Pareto-ef f icient utility
possibility frontier, while simultaneously improving equity by in-
creasing the equality of benefits or of lifetime full income received
by Student A and Student B. In contrast, a move from X to Y involves
a trade-off in the sense that equality, and social welfare, are
increased (since Y is above W W ) but only at the cost of a loss in
efficiency.
T. W. Schultz has some interesting suggestions to make (Chapter 2)
about organizational changes within the education sector intended to
improve efficiency, moving outward and upward from points like Z in
Figure 1 and thereby freeing resources that can be used to improve
child equity.
Production Efficiency and Exchange Efficiency
Efficiency has two major aspects: production efficiency which
refers to the efficiency with which inputs of time and resources are
combined in the educational process to secure desired outcomes, and
exchange efficiency which refers to the efficiency with which appro-
priate educational outcomes are matched with educational needs.
Production efficiency is developed in Figure 2a with two inputs,
and in Figure 2b with two outputs, based on the production function
given by Eq. (1) above. For the two-inputs case isoquent 0^ Q^ illu-
strates combinations of student time and teacher time used to produce
one unit of output, as used by J. Alan Thomas in Chapter 4 to investi-
gate the efficiency in the use of teacher time as it is used to elicit
student "time on task."
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The isoquant in Figure 2 is a unit isoquant (with the index of output
and all inputs divided by the output index) , so that all output dots
above Q. Q„ are less efficient production points. Technical efficiency
exists when any point on Q^^ Q„ is reached, characterized by a reorga-
nization of available resources in such a way that efficiency is maxi-
mized. Price efficiency involves further consideration of the cost
of resources used. In this case, the costs of teacher-time and the
costs of student-time as measured by foregone earnings or other oppor-
tunities is weighed until the most productive combination of resources
is obtained. A movement from Z to B constitutes an improvement in
technical efficiency; a movement from B to 6, constitutes an improve-
ment in price efficiency; and only at 6 is full economic efficiency
achieved.
Production efficiency in education also involves the choice of
optimum outputs, among various alternatives, as illustrated in Figure
2b. Tliere is more than one output in education at both the intermediate
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and final-good levels. Within higher education, for example, there are
instruction, research, and public service at the intermediate-good level,
as well as breakdowns in terms of disciplines and individual courses.
At the final, or more ultimate outcome level there are monetary and non-
monetary returns over the life cycle. At elementary and secondary
levels there are breakdowns by subject and between cognitive and non-
cognitive outcomes. Figure 2b illustrates a choice between academic
skills and athletics common to both, with inefficiency points below
the production frontier, so that a movement from point Z to point D
constitutes achievement of technical efficiency . There is no pure
price efficiency since outputs are not sold for a price on the market,
but there is an analogous concept that can be called allocative effi-
ciency. It relates to the attainment of educational goals, given in
this case by the educational policy maker' s utility function UU.
These goals are always implicit, and sometimes explicit, so that a
movement from point D to point 6^ constitutes an improvement in allo-
cative efficiency.
This situation is typical of cost effectiveness analysis discussed
by Richard Rossmiller in Chapter 8. Cost effectiveness decisions are
made every day by Vice Chancellor's for Academic Affairs and by school
district superintendents, but since the cost effectiveness analysis
that is done is normally implicit rather than explicit, it often does
not go by that name. The state of the art of cost effectiveness ana-
lysis that is creatively surveyed by Richard Rossmiller in Chapter 8
is illustrated for a particular school system by Terry Geske in
Chapter 9. This theoretical framework, with the production function
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as shown in Figure 2, brings out quite forcefully the point that appro-
priate results from cost-effectiveness analysis, and the achievement
of economic efficiency, depend heavily on the appropriate specification
of educational goals.
Exchange efficiency
,
in contrast to production efficiency, deals
with the exchange or delivery of a given output of educational services
to families. It involves changes until the lifetime utility of students
and families cannot be further increased. The total lifetime returns
from education for Student A and Student B in Figure 1 are sensitive to
how the fixed totals of math, English, aesthetic programs, and health
programs are distributed between them. These fixed totals represented
by points 6^ and 6^ in Figure 2 when distributed between Students A and
B in a fixed way are on a utility frontier in Figure 1 that is below
line BB; a reallocation of these educational outcomes between them
could improve exchange efficiency and move the welfare of all outward
to line BB , the grand utility possibility frontier.
Human capital skills cannot be exchanged among students since
human capital is embodied in individuals. But there are many examples
of the potential for increasing exchange efficiency in education as
these skills are being created, and as students are allocated among
classes and institutions. Special education programs that try to
match programs with needs and abilities, free choice by college stu-
dents of their major, and the nationwide occupational and institutional
choice information system developed by ACT all have a bearing on
exchange efficiency. Budgeting and financing decisions that limit
resources in some fields, sometimes due to trade union and other
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monopoly restrictions, lead to unrealistically high test score require-
ments and quotas in those fields and exchange inefficiency.
In this book exchange efficiency arises in connection with the
discussion of student aid programs designed to release the constraints
of scholarship and other financing patterns that require attendance at
particular institutions. Roe L. Johns discusses voucher plans in
Chapter 11 which are still at an experimental stage at the elementary
and secondary levels, partly because of the concern that they could be
used to finance segregationist and religious schools in spite of limits
on this rooted in the Constitution. Walter W. McMahon and Alan Wagner
consider in Chapter 6 the widely different monetary rates of return to
education found in different college-related occupations, and their
relation to the choice by students of their college major. The Com-
munity College movement and the Federal Basic Economic Opportunity
Grant program also are related to exchange efficiency (apart from
their equity objectives) by widening the range of options available
for choice, both among curricula and among institutions, assuming stu-
dents are reasonably knowledgeable about their longer run best
interests. All provide a degree of competition which, together with
continuing internal efforts for accountability and cost effectiveness,
enrolls the user in helping to police the system.
An Efficiency Criterion Hierarchy
Overall efficiency criteria are essential if it is to be deter-
mined whether each practical budget decision in the financing of edu-
cation will or will not improve economic efficiency. Economic effi-
ciencv in turn is essential if massive waste is to be avoided and
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(together with equity criteria) further progress made toward the bliss
point and humane growth.
The efficiency criteria hierarchy suggested below is designed for
use within public and private non-profit institutions because educa-
tional institutions are almost always of this type. We do not choose
to enter into the public sector private sector debate for the most
part in this book, but instead take the view that all non-profit
institutions normally have clear incentives to minimize waste and nor-
mally take steps to do so as best they know how. Many of the problems
are merely with the state of the art. Public institutions, and pri-
vate institutions can reasonably be assumed to seek to optimize the
quantity and/or quality of their outputs within the budgets that they
are given (although outsiders may not always agree with their goals).
For if they do not, boards of trustees, school boards, and legislative
support become disaffected, budget support for subunits and whole
units erodes, and administrators are replaced eventually and quietly
without outsiders being aware of the reasons. A managerial discretion
model for non-profit institutions developed and tested by W. McMahon
and C. Strein (1979) suggests that discretionary revenue sometimes
exists, and that optimizing behavior does not preclude some ineffi-
ciency. A theory of public sector institutions alone has been deve-
loped further by W. McMahon (1970, 1971). Earlier A. Downs (1957) and
others have considered this replacement process.
The following efficiency criterion hierarchy is suggested, ranked
from the lowest efficiency criterion to the criterion that would guide
faculty governance systems and administrators toward the highest level
of efficiency. The problems in measuring the outputs is a well known
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limitation of the state of the art that forces practical applications
toward lower-level efficiency criteria such as cost-effectiveness ana-
lysis of interTnediate outputs, but the progress being made in measuring
outputs will be discussed later in this book. Finally, these effi-
ciency criteria are limited to a focus on efficiency; they provide no
guidance about equity:
1. Simple Accountability Tests . Normal financial accounting
controls, and checks on whether listed course offerings are accurate,
are lower level efficiency criteria since they fail to analyze func-
tional relations, costs, or usefulness of the services. This type of
efficiency criteria is often all that is used since most schools and
colleges do not possess management information systems that are
sophisticated enough to obtain even approximate relationships between
changes in educational practices and outcomes. Competency testing is
a somewhat better measure because at least it tries to measure out-
puts, rather than inputs. The interesting debate over national com-
petency testing is considered by Allan Odden in Chapter 16. But from
the point of view of efficiency criteria, competency testing is still
at the lower end with other accountability tests.
2. Production Function Relationship . These help to select the
more effective techniques useful in producing the desired outcomes.
They can range from trial and error (what works) to simultaneous pro-
duction function relationships of the type included in Elchanan Cohn's
model in Chapter 13. They are still not among the highest level effi-
ciency criteria because they give no consideration to the costs of
inputs involved in producing the outcomes.
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3. Cost-Effectiveness Analysis . Costs are considered in relation
to the output quantities obtained. Frequently only part of the costs
are included, omitting the cost of student tirae, with the point of
view limited to that of the institution. Frequently also only the
intermediate outputs such as instructional units are analyzed with
longer run outcomes ignored. However, even with these limitations,
if the decision maker's goals are well conceived, cost-effectiveness
ratios can be helpful guides to increased efficiency. As mentioned
above, most cost effectiveness analysis is implicit, as educational
policy makers make daily decisions, but an excellent survey of more
explicit current applications is offered by Richard Rossmiller in
Chapter 8.
4. Cost-Benefit Analysis . Costs are considered in relation to
the value of outputs, and either benefit/cost ratios, or rates of
return which are a form of benefit/cost ratios are calculated. As
practiced in the economics of education thus far, the measurement of
benefits is usually limited to monetary earnings which are the more
easily measurable part, although full costs are considered. These
monetary returns to education over time, by type of occupation, and by
type of institution are considered by Walter W. McMahon and Alan P.
Wagner in Chapter 6.
The highest level of private efficiency criteria is finally
achieved when the non-monetary private returns of the type considered
by Robert T. Michael in Chapter 5 are measured and included in the
measure of benefits.
5. Cost-Benefit Analvsis with Social Benefits Included. The
highest level efficiency criterion from the point of view of society
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as a whole must consider the full costs as well as the full benefits
to society when calculating more comprehensive rates of return or
other benefit cost ratios. The student needs think only about the
private benefits and private costs to himself and his family, but
those educational policy makers whose responsibility is to think
about all persons in their jurisdiction must include the full bene-
fits, including the benefits of research to future generations and the
spillover benefits from education to society in relation to the full
cost to society, including the tax cost and endowment fund subsidies
in their calculations. Thomas Jefferson had a great deal to say about
the importance of mass education (he urged public support by the State
of Virginia for it) to effective individual participation in the
democratic process as a key means to the preservation of our freedoms.
These are undoubtedly the hardest kind of benefits to measure,
although considerable progress has been made in measuring the benefits
from research that go beyond those received by the individual scien-
tist or his institution.
Improvements in private and social efficiency can be viewed as a
disequilibrium process, investing where the rates of return (or
benefit/cost ratios) are highest, since investment at these points has
the greatest payoff in benefits for each dollar invested. As this
process continues fewer resources are wasted and progress is made
toward production and exchange efficiency in creating human resources
and securing the full benefits of education. As measures of the non-
monetary private and social benefits gradually improve, the higher
level efficiency criteria can be used more often as the criteria rele-
vant to attainment of the grand utility possibility frontier. Given
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the criteria, improvement in the measurement of non-monetary private
and social benefits can also be important in increasing education's
contribution to humane growth.
III. Equity
The concern with equity has dominated the educational finance
literature. In school finance, this dominance has been overwhelming;
in higher education finance it has not been as exclusive of other con-
cerns but has been pervasive.
The focus of the concern with equity is almost exclusively on the
point that family income or wealth should not dominate differences in
expenditure per pupil among school districts or control access to a
college education. Tlie reason for this focus in the educational
finance literature is probably in the deeply held individual beliefs
in our society that fairness is important: equal treatment of equals
in the opportunities available in life and fairness in competing for
earnings in the market, especially at the starting line. Reinforcing
this, x>7idely held philosophical values tend to go even more deeply in
western civilization to include belief in the innate worth in each
human soul. In responsive representative systems widely held indi-
vidual beliefs such as these get translated into public policy. The
result is a social contract that is expressed in the educational
finance literature as child equity and tax equity.
Yet inequity still permeates the system. It is evidenced by vast
inequality in expenditure per pupil among states and within states.
Some inequity arises as the result of the trade-off with efficiency
—
but not all. Whether a nation's best interests lie with universal
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education or with concentration of resources on the higher ability
groups is a compelling question. But the vast inequality in expen-
diture per pupil among school districts, among community college
districts, and in the percentage of children from high income and low
income families that go to college has little connection to early stu-
dent ability and is hard to justify from a longer range perspective on
efficiency grounds.
In spite of the emphasis on equity in the literature, and the ine-
quity that persists, the recent state reform efforts at the elementary
and secondary level are shown by Stephen Carroll in his definitive
econometric study in Chapter 14 to have led to some improvement in tax
equity, but little per pupil equalization. Student equity deserves
therefore to receive greater emphasis than tax equity, since tax equity
is a concern shared with the broader profession of public finance eco-
nomists whereas student equity is the more pressing problem within
educational finance, and the one on which less progress is being made.
The place to begin this theoretical framework for the inclusion of
equity considerations therefore is with student equity, which will be
extended to include intergenerational equity as it relates to the
intergenerational transmission of inequality. This will be followed
by an hierarchy of equity criteria.
Tvoes of Ecuitv
The term student equity will be used to include both horizontal
and vertical equity among pre-school, elementary, and secondary pupils
(child equity), as well as among community college, college, graduate.
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on-the-job training, and senior citizen adults. Efficiency considera-
tions become relatively more important than equity in graduate educa-
tion and in access to on the job training programs in later years.
But efficiency criteria do include the non-monetary private and social
benefits of education some of which are especially relevant to the
years after retirement.
Measures of equity all require the assumption that it is possible
to make inter-personal comparisons of utility, an assumption that
takes practical work with equity out of the scientific confines of
pure economics. But these measures are not outside the range of phi-
losophy, and of concepts important in western civilization such as
equal rights, and the equal worth of each human life at least when
net of any human capital additions. Lionel Robbins in a nice state-
ment on interpersonal comparisons of utility (1938) says, "I do not
believe and I have never believed that in fact men are necessarily
equal or should always be judged as such. But I do believe that in
most cases, political calculations which do not treat them as if they
were equal are morally revolting." The philosophical and legal roots
of equity are investigated further in a scholarly and fascinating way
by Kern Alexander and T. R. Melcher in Chapter 10, and there will be
other opportunities to draw on their contribution in this introductory
chapter.
Horizontal equity
,
or equal treatment of equals , is important both
to student equity and to tax equity. Within student equity it implies
equal expenditure on pupils of equal ability and capacities, using the
philosophical and legal bases for making interpersonal comparisons.
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rather than economics, as indicated above. A very interesting discus-
sion of the current concerns at the national level with child equity
appears as part of Allan Odden's contribution in Chapter 16.
Horizontal equity in taxation under the same assumptions implies
equal tax effort among taxpayers who have equal income and wealth.
Tax effort is measured by expressing tax receipts as a percent of
income and assets (or total wealth including human capital) to obtain
an effective tax rate. In practice, wealth in school finance has
usually been limited to a measure of real property wealth, the tax
handle available to the school district, although an increasing number
of states have turned toward a measure of wealth that includes income
and toward the use of circuit breakers for low income families in
order to relate the concept of fairness to individual taxpayers, the
effective rates they pay, and their ability-to-pay.
Vertical equity
,
or unequal treatment of unequals , when applied to
either the expenditure side or the tax side must resort to the equal
sacrifice doctrine of public finance developed by Edgeworth, (1925,
pp. 100 ff), and R. Musgrave (1959, pp. 90-115, and others. On the
philosophical and legal basis for interpersonal comparisons mentioned
above, the maximization of social welfare at point fi, in Figure 3a
below requires equal marginal benefit (which maximizes the total bene-
fit from education received by all) , as well as equal marginal sacri-
fice (which minimizes the total sacrifice borne by taxpayers. For
students whose abilities are equal and whose parents socio-economic
status is the same, equal marginal benefit would imply equal expendi-
ture per pupil (as in Figure 3a). In this case, horizontal equity and
vertical equity are identical.
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However the parents' wealth and education which make up their SES
are not equal. Those with higher income tend to live in the better
school districts where there is larger expenditure per pupil, and to
send their children through more years of post-secondary education.
The parents' wealth taxed for support of the primary and secondary
schools contributes to achievement through the ability to secure
better and more experienced teachers, and through better support for
special education programs as is brought out in the conclusions drawn
by Richard Rossmiller from his interesting survey of production func-
tion studies in Chapter 8. Within the classroom, good teachers and
smaller class tutorial arrangements also contribute to more "student
time or task" as discovered in the work by ^Uan Thomas, F. Kemmerer,
and D. Mork in Chapter 4, consistent with some positive relationship
between school resources and achievement. But this is not to say that
the school does or can do it all. The parents' SES, by facilitating
choice of the neighborhood in which the family lives, is also asso-
ciated with "neighborhood effects" and with the role-models enabling
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the student to see more clearly the relation between education and the
job market—factors which Charles Benson finds also to be related to
achievement in Chapter 3. Finally, the effect of the parents' income
and wealth on the child's education does not end with the secondary
school, for in spite of the innovation of community colleges and
Federal Basic Economic Opportunity Grants (BEOG's), the parents' SES
is associated with more years in college and hence with more monetary
and non-monetary returns to the student over his life cycle as is
developed further in Chapters 5 and 6.
Intergenerational Equity . There is therefore an important inter-
generational dimension to the concept of equity in educational finance,
as is appropriately stressed by Susan Nelson in her discussion of it
in Chapter 12. This is illustrated in Figure 3b, which measures the
current full consumption (utilities) of the family on the horizontal
axis, and future full consumption including the future lifetime full
consumption of the children on the vertical axis. As parents invest
resources and as children invest their own time in human capital for-
mation, their capacity to enhance their future earnings and their non-
monetary returns is increased. This increases the children's future
full consumption (upward along line PP in Figure 3b). Since parents'
resources are unequal, the future consumption of the children from the
high income families is increased the most, and the result is an
intergenerational transmission of inequality.
Intergenerational equity implies that the parents invest suf-
ficiently in their children's education that current and future full
consumption (utilities) of the family are maximized. Children are
-30-
without resources, and myopic, so the parents invest considerable
amounts in their behalf. Some parents are myopic, or selfish, so from
an equity point of view, the omniscient ethical observer must be
called upon again to locate the welfare function W in Figure 3b. If
this involves an efficient solution in the sense that current plus
future consumption are maximized, and an equitable allocation of this
consumption between the two generations, then the point of constrained
bliss at ^j in Figure 3b is located for this family.
However not all families have equal financial resources. There-
fore it is only after steps have been taken to achieve vertical equity
among unequals that point Q^ in Figure 3b also implies achievement of
social bliss. Then the path of efficiency and equity over time, as the
production opportunities set expands, is designated the path of humane
growth.
What Does Vertical Equity Imply ?
Given that there are differences in parental and student economic
resources (or SES) that do make a difference in the future full income
and consumption of individuals, what does vertical equity imply? On
the tax side does it imply equal effort in school finance (i.e., equal
tax rates which amount to proportional taxation) and equal "expected
parental contributions" as a percent of income (again proportional
rates) in the need analysis procedures used in higher education
finance? Or does vertical equity imply progressive tax rates?
Similarly, on the benefit side, does it imply equal public expen-
diture per pupil recognizing that private expenditure is very unequal,
or does it imply reverse progression in the benefit rates in the form
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of special programs for the low income disadvantaged and costly spe-
cial education programs for the handicapped? The concept of positive
equity developed by the philosopher John Rawls corresponds more closely
to progressive rates on the tax or on the benefit side taken alone
since it involves the effort to correct social wrongs borne by the
recipient for which he was not responsible.
The answer is not simple. If one sticks purely to equity terms,
the equity principle of equal sacrifice does not necessarily imply
progressive rates. Assuming that there is a declining marginal uti-
lity of income, in the sense that the last dollar of income is worth
less when one is wealthy than it is when one is poor, equal absolute
sacrifice and equal proportional sacrifice can still imply regressive
or proportional rates on either the tax or the benefit side, as is
more typical of current state and local educational financing acti-
vities. The trends in state taxation creatively analyzed by John Due,
an expert in this field, in Chapter 15 suggest some shifts toward
roughly proportional state income tax sources in recent years, with
Proposition 13 perhaps affecting student equity by shifting a larger
percent of the support for the schools to the state level.
Viewed from the point of view of maximizing social welfare, and
obtaining the bliss points Q, and P.^ in Figure 3, the equity principle
of equal sacrifice and equal benefit must be interpreted as equal
marginal sacrifice and equal marginal benefit, which would be the cri-
teria for maximization of welfare and minimization of aggregate sacri-
fice. Equal marginal sacrifice in turn, under the assumption of the
declining marginal utility of income, requires progressive tax rates
such as are found in the Federal income tax. Equal marginal benefits
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in the ultimate returns from education imply reverse progression in
the benefit rates as illustrated by the Federal Title I programs for
disadvantaged elementary school pupils and BEOG grants for college
students from poor and low-middle income families.
The Trade-off and Complementarity with Efficiency
Going too far in this direction runs into a conflict with effi-
ciency. Vertical equity that minimizes aggregate sacrifice on the tax
side would require equal incomes, and vertical equity on the benefit
side would require not only corrective programs, but also equal expen-
diture on all students of equal ability. This loss of efficiency
would shift the grand utility possibility frontier in Figure 3a to the
left, and prevent the attainment of the bliss point at Q , . T. W.
Schultz develops this point further in his contribution in Chapter 2.
In addition to the potential loss of efficiency, the resources
available to education (and hence lines BB and PP in Figure 3) can
sometimes be affected adversely, as suggested by John Due in Chapter
15. He suggests that special programs can sometimes become very
costly, especially when they are supported through the political pro-
cess by well organized groups. There are the expenditures required to
equip busses and buildings for paraplegics, for example, or some spe-
cial education programs in the schools. These costs can appear waste-
ful to the taxpayers, and lead to a taxpayers reaction that shifts the
resource constraints downward.
But the most important potential exists where complementarities
permit equity and efficiency to be produced simultaneously. If abil-
ity measures largely reflect achievement and parental SES , rather
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than innate ability, then vertical equity is less in conflict with
efficiency, and even meritocracies can be more equitable, for example.
An Equity Criterion Hierarchy
Overall equity criteria are essential if it is to be determined
whether or not each budget change in the financing of education
reduces inequity. Then, together with use of the efficiency criteria,
if there is an improvement in equity with no reduction in efficiency,
a contribution is being made to humane growth.
Public institutions have an incentive to be equitable whenever
one-man-one vote systems and provisions for equal extension of the
franchise prevail. If groups that have the vote cannot gain or main-
tain access to educational institutions, they hope the opportunity to
vote more or less as a block, shifting the center of balance as bet-
ween the major factions in power somewhat in their direction. Private
schools and colleges frequently have such an incentive also, since
they are normally non-profit institutions, originally associated with
the church, and frequently include an element of altruism among their
objectives. The College Scholarship Service, for example, was origi-
nally founded with the support of private school financial aid offi-
cers who sought through their mutual efforts to minimize the "buying"
of students and make the size of the student aid offer reflect finan-
cial need more adequately.
An equity criterion hierarchy is presented below. It should be made
very clear that it goes beyond pure economics because it requires inter-
pesonal comparisons of utility, and draws on wider philosophical bases
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such as those cited above by Lionel Robbins in order to make such com-
parisons. To arrive at a rank order of the criteria listed, there are
at least three bases that point toward roughly the same ranking:
a) maximization of social welfare which is attained only by moving
toward equal marginal educational benefit and equal marginal tax sacri-
fice, b) Supreme Court rulings as analyzed by Kern Alexander in Chapter
10 which include the recent rulings in state supreme courts, and c) the
philosophical basis of equity as an ethical principle, as developed
recently for example by John Rawls (1977).
The equity criteria developed here keep equity on the tax side and
equity on the expenditure side conceptually separate, rather than merg-
ing the two criteria. This approach is consistent X'/ith that chosen
by Joseph Peclsnian and by Susan Nelson in her analysis of equity and of
changes in equity in post secondary education in Chapter 12.
1. Commutative Equity
,
the first level, implies that the state
leaves undisturbed the results of the market place. In its most extreme
fotrm, it leaves little room for public schools even at the local level
for even within localities there is some interfamily redistribution of
benefits. Within the private sector, in its extreme form the existence
of purely selfless altruistic motivations tends to be challenged by the
concept of commutative equity, and presumably private scholarship funds
would be used only to attract the most able students— if there were less
prior achievement for whatever reason, need would not be considered.
This reliance on laissez-faire implies emphasis on pure competition and
opposition to monopoly, both of which can contribute to the achievement
of Pareto efficiency. But this much alone makes no provision for wealth
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transfers per se; they involve conflict as moves are made along the
grand utility possibility frontier. The commutative equity criterion
allows unlimited differences in wealth among parents to persist, un-
limited differences in expenditure per child, and unlimited intergen-
erational transmission of inequality.
2. Fiscal Neutrality means the state will seek to achieve a
degree of equity through transfer payments so that local educational
institutions including community colleges are treated as though they
had access to an equivalent amount of wealth per pupil. After attain-
ment of an equal fiscal base (which seldom is attained under current
practices) unlimited variation in local effort would be permitted, as
would unlimited variation in expenditure per pupil.
State school finance systems generally go beyond commutative equity
and part of the distance toward fiscal neutrality, although Serrano and
later decisions in the California Supreme Court have continued to hold
the California school finance system unconstitutional on the basis of
the lack of fiscal neutrality, and most other state school finance
systems could not currently meet this test. Similarly, the financing
of higher education goes beyond commutative equity through for
example, use of private scholarship funds based in part on need, state
scholarship commission grants, and Federal BEOG grants based on need.
But it also falls short of fiscal neutrality. Even if fiscal neutral-
ity were approached in all educational finance, neither horizontal
nor vertical equity among taxpayers nor among students would be fully
achieved. This is because even if tastes were identical, the fiscal
neutrality concept on the tax side measures wealth on a per student
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rather than a per taxpayer basis, and measures only part of the tax-
payers wealth, both of which disrupt taxpayer equity. On the expen-
diture side, even if wealth per pupil were identical, full student
equity would not be achieved because pupils differ in other ways due
to their past advantages and their capacities.
The achievement of fiscal neutrality, however, should move the
current system which contains significant inequality in expenditure
based on income and wealth toward greater horizontal and a higher
level of vertical tax and student equity, and toward less intergenera-
tional transmission of inequality.
3. Horizontal Equity, Plus (Proportional) Vertical Equity . This
requires equal effort on the tax side, and equal expenditure per student
of equal capacities on the expenditure side. It corresponds to Kern
Alexander's "Restitution" level of equity in Chapter 10 which includes
but goes beyond fiscal neutrality. Proportional taxation on the tax
side involves more restitution than does regressive taxation, although
true vertical equity must be expressed in terms of individual persons
rather than school districts, implying that effort for this purpose must
consider earnings as well as assets. Student equity in this case in-
volves equal expenditure in real terms (and hence the cost-of-delivering
education adjustments due for example to geographical differences in the
cost of living mentioned by Alexander). Among students who are unequal,
the clear definition of reverse-proportional vertical equity is more
difficult. It implies rectification both of shortcomings at the local
district level and proportional and non-progressive rectification for
the culturally disadvantaged through special education programs. This
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would not preclude the more able moving ahead faster, or completing
advanced degrees more frequently.
This level of equity most closely corresponds to equality of educa-
tional opportunity. In achieving horizontal and vertical equity on both
the tax and expenditure side, it still allows for differences in total
expenditure based on differences in tastes (e.g., some tastes are more
myopic) and on differences in innate ability. This level therefore
severely reduces but would not eliminate intergenerational transmission
of inequality of earnings.
4. Positivism
,
the fourth-ranked and final equity criterion includes
all that has gone before but with respect to vertical equity, implies
progressive rates on both the tax and benefit sides. This is Rawlsian
equity, designed to have a corrective effect on the current income dis-
tribution, and to assist the least advantaged. As Alexander suggests,
this would imply full financing by the state of high cost programs for
the handicapped or the disadvantaged children and students, BEOG grants
for the poor, and affirmitive action. It is consistent with concepts
of equal marginal benefit, and hence with maximization of the social wel-
fare function under the assumptions stated above.
Finally, it is suggested here that this level of positivism among
equity criteria also implies a correction for those individual cases
where parents and students have myopic tastes as the intergenerational
welfare function shown in Figure 3b implies, quite apart from the social
rate of discount required to attain the golden rule path. This fourth
and final level of equity, therefore, also implies elimination of environ-
mentally-induced intergenerational transmission of inequality, and at-
tainment of intergenerational distributive justice among peers.
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IV. Humane Growth
The contribution of all of education and of academic research to
humane growth include their contribution to earnings, to non-monetary
private and social benefits vital to the quality of human life, and
their contribution (through intergenerational equity) to distributive
justice.
On Hierarchy of Humane Growth Criteria
The challenge is to bring together the efficiency criteria and the
equity criteria into what will be called humane growth criteria. A
combined but practical criteria needs to be developed for use in speci-
fic budget decisions if inefficiency and inequity are to be reduced,
and the contribution of education to humane growth in the society is to
be optimized. In sum:
Efficiency Criteria Equity Criteria
1. Accountability 1. Commutative Equity
2. Production Function Relationships 2. Fiscal Neutrality
3. Cost/Effectiveness 3. Proportional Equity
4. Cost/Monetary Benefit 4. Positivism, or Social
5. Cost/Total Private Benefit Justice
6. Cost/Total Benefit
Humane Growth Criteria
1. Improvements in efficiency, with no reduction
in equity.
2. Improvements in equity, with no reduction in
efficiency.
3. Improvements in both efficiency and equity.
These humane growth criteria limit policy changes quite severely
to an area where efficiency and equity are complementary, consisting
of a rectangle in Figure 3a defined by inefficient and inequitable
point Z, point Y on the efficiency frontier, point X*, and the bliss
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point n representing optimum efficiency and justice. Specifically,
the first humane growth criterion would permit changes in education
budgets that improve efficiency along the extension of the line OZ,
so that proportional equity under the same assumptions as before is
undisturbed, as well as points toward J2 from ZY. Criterion 2 would
permit changes in educational finance that improve equity, moving from
points along ZY toward X* Q^ in such a way that efficiency is not
reduced. Criterion 3 consists of moves from Z toward the efficiency
frontier and toward fi, anywhere within this rectangle. Focusing only
on student equity and lifetime redistribution, note that nowhere
within triangle ZYf^ , is student A worse off in any absolute sense.
To go beyond this gets into the trade-off between efficiency and
equity. Atkinson's equality measure, as developed by P. R. G. Layard
and A. Walters (1978, p. 48) defines points along the iso-welfare func-
tion W_W„ in Figure 1 in such a way that the measure of inequality (in
contrast to the Gini coefficient) is specifically related to the Welfare
Function. Atkinson would define equally distributed equivalent life-
time earnings from education, X* in Figure 3a, as the earnings level
that if everybody had it would generate the same level of welfare as
the present distribution of real income at point Y; both are on the
same welfare contour line. If average income happens to be at point
Q,, then Atkinson's equality measure is defined as
Social welfare increases if X* increases toward 2 since fi, is on a
higher welfare contour. But similarly, social welfare increases if
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the average benefit (or average income) Q increases due to improve-
ments in efficiency by more than the measure of equality, E, falls
since by rearranging (4):
(5) X* = E f2^
This is a theoretical framework for saying whether or not any given
improvement in efficiency increases average lifetime income suf-
ficiently to outweigh any adverse distributional effects. The point
might be kept in mind when reading T. W. Schultz' contribution in
Chapter 1. We can also say whether an inefficient policy of equaliza-
tion is justified, which is relevant to the problem that arises when
compensating school districts on equity grounds for the effects on
children of their inefficient scale.
To make this efficiency-equity trade-off criteria operational
requires using some specific welfare function, defining W„Wj^ in Figure
3b for example, as:
(6) W^ = - v*^ + - v" , < a < 1
a ' A a - B '
This requires that the omniscient ethical observer, or the educational
policy maker, or the researcher, must examine his ethical views and
specify the alpha-weights.
If a = 1, social welfare is tlie simple sum of lifetime earnings on
total well being of A and B and we are indifferent to the distribution
of earnings as in commutative equitv. As a =^0, W^ = log v, + log y„
,
U 'A o
and a given number of dollars can accomplish a larger proportional
increase if used to benefit the student who is currently worse-off in
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terms of benefits until benefits are equal, approximately our equality-
of-educational-opportunity equity criterion #3. RQwlsian positivism
arises as a 4= - D, with differing degrees of corrective action for the
disadvantaged. An interesting example of a welfare function being
applied verbally to current equity problems in school finance will be
found in the contribution by Roe L. Johns in Chapter 11.
Complementarity . Humane growth criteria as defined above however
emphasizes the opportunities for complementarity between efficiency
and equity rather than the trade-offs. In fact, greater care is
suggested where there are trade-offs because selecting the weights in
the welfare function needed for appraising the relative value of effi-
ciency and equity is more tenuous. There are of course points like
Y in Figure 1 that are less efficient than point X, but are more
equitable, and are to be preferred to point X, given that they lie
above the level of welfare on which X is located. Furthermore, there
are better opportunities for efficiency and equity to be improved
jointly in education than in the economy as a whole where trade-offs
are more inportant. This is because with young people, equality of
opportunity may actually be a motivating force generating lifetime
income where otherwise there would be none, and thereby translate into
future work incentives. Whereas transfer programs among adults if
carried too far involve trade-offs with efficiency.
Measurement . Measurement of humane growth criteria is merely in
terms of measurement of the component efficiency and equity criteria.
Efficiency criteria up through level 4, monetary rates of return
(e.g., Chapter 6) are extensively measured. The problem is to get to
a total rate of return that includes non-monetary private and social
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benefits. The first step toward this is to identify the non-monetary
returns and to measure their relative importance, work that is well
underway as indicated by Robert Michael's survey in Chapter 5, Next,
ways must be explored of imputing a value to these, such as the explor-
atory steps in W, McMahon (1974) toward a total private rate of return.
There are also other well known imputations based on opportunity costs
such as those for the imputed rental value of owner occupied housing or
the value of non-monetary job satisfactions that suggest a model. Im-
putations for social benefits will take longer, but eventually there
may be a total rate of return for use as a total efficiency criterion.
Equity criteria currently are measured (focusing on student equity)
largely in terms of the degree of inequality in expenditure per pupil.
A promising approach would seem to be to extend this into a broader
measure of the impact through education of the parents income and
wealth on the students lifetime earnings and well being, which picks
up the neighborhood effects on human capital formation explored by
Charles Benson in Chapter 3. This kind of research, which is vital,
together with research on the components, namely the relation of human
capital formation to the lifetime income distribution later, is
plunging ahead as seen in the excellent survey by Gian Sahota (1978,
pp. 11-40) and is laying the foundations for a theory of distributive
justice. The income distribution front of human capital theory in
fact is currently riding the crest of the wave.
Once it becomes feasible to calculate a separate rate of return
to investment in human capital that measures intergenerational equity
-43-
through the redistributive effect on lifetime income and lifetime well-
being, the rest is simple. If this rate of return reflecting distribu-
tive justice, and a separate total return in terms of efficiency from
any given investment were both positive, there would be complemen-
tarity between efficiency and equity as we have defined it here. In
the meantime of course more informal judgments about movements toward
humane growth must suffice.
Some Examples . Improvements in equity can sometimes not only fail
to impede efficiency, but might even contribute to improvements in ef-
ficiency. One example may be what is peotentially an emerging empirical
law of educational finance alluded to earlier. It indicates that as ex-
penditure per pupil increases, decreasing percentages of the budget are
spent on instructional staff and increasing percentages on other kinds
of staff. This pattern found in higher education by Howard Bowen in
Chapter 7 and among local school districts by Steven Carroll in Chapter
14 suggests that when the extra dollars per pupil are not spent to
improve the quality of instruction and research, equalization can
reduce waste and improve efficiency in the use of these dollars.
An example of the intergenerational complementarity between equity
and efficiency specified by Humane Growth Criterion 3 might be found
in special education for unemployed teenagers and drop outs. Oppor-
tunity costs of the students' time are low, so the total rate of
return is high. It is redistributive since the parents in question
are unlikely to finance it, and the future income of the otherwise
less successful student is increased the most. There are social bene-
fits in the form of cost savings in the short run for crime reduction
and in longer run welfare costs.
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Exaraples of how improvements in efficiency can improve equity,
Criterion 1 or 3, are offered by T. W. Schultz in Chapter 1, who points
to the waste in administration and organization of the overgrown metro-
politan school systems.
Finally, there is an automatic contribution of efficiency in in-
vestment to intergenerational equity. This occurs as rates of growth
of investment in human capital exceed rates of growth of investment in
physical capital, presumably in response to the higher total rates of
return on human capital. Since income from property and physical capi-
tal is a major source of inequality, the increasing relative importance
of income from human capital gradually reduces some of the inequality in
the distribution of income.
Dynamic Aspects and Optimization . Although past rates of return
and measures of inequality or inequity are often a pretty good guide to
what these will be in the near and intermediate future, caution is es-
sential because they are not perfect forecasts. Job markets can change
secularly due to technological discoveries or changing birth rates, and
the income distribution forecast can also change as a result, so that
some thought as to what these will be in the future is essential.
Criteria based on current and past data are not always misleading, but
must be used with some thought to the future and with care in budget
planning.
Optimization techniques such as the goal programming applied by
Elchanan Cohn in Chapter 13 combining efficiency and equity offer con-
siderable promise. They do require specification of an objective
function analogous to the welfare function discussed above that con-
tains distributive justice weights. If the objectives were the re-
turns or benefits of education expressed in value terms, and including
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equiCy weights, the first order conditions in this education optimiza-
tion/cost minimization framework could also be interpreted as a very
closely related type of humane growth criterion. But these models also
need to contemplate the effects of dynamic optimization, as well as the
effects of external forces in the future, again commending caution in
the use of the results.
A Theory of Educational Finance
The theory of educational finance set out above, although not set
out formally in equation form and solved, does contain the necessary
elements. They are—for the objective function— the returns to educa-
tion which include non-monetary returns and the equity criteria to be
applied toward the attainment of distributive justice. For the con-
straints necessary to the constrained optimization the elements are the
production function relationships which allow for the role of the parents
and neighborhood effects, and the investment cost constraints. The con-
cept of human capital formation is a great aid to specification and
measurement in an internally consistent way of the total ultimate re-
turns to education, the full costs, and the intergenerational effects
on the income distribution, while demonstrating significant explana-
tory power as shown in Chapters 5 and 6. Human capital concepts, in
contrast to the screening and credentialling effects which overlap the
effects of human capital formation to a significant extent and describe
more limited phenomena, also are taking educational finance into a new
era. So for these reasons we have chosen to given them a significant
role in this theory of educational finance.
The hierarchy of efficiency criteria and the hierarchy of equity
criteria may prove useful as the pressures for efficienc]/ from taxpayers
through tight budgets continues, and as the awareness of continuing
student inequity spreads. But beyond this, the theory of educational
finance combines emerging measures of non-monetary private and social
benefits as essential to efficiency, and criteria for intergenerational
equity as necessary to distributive justice, in a more comprehensive
approach toward humane growth.
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Footnotes
*The author is indebted to Terry G. Geske, Carolyn H. McMahon, and
John Graham for helpful comments.
For readers not familiar with isoquants, more detailed explanations
are available in Henderson and Quandt (1971, 58-62, 89-91) or any
other standard microeconomic theory text.
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